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Probert: Nibbling at the Problems of Medical Malpractice

NIBBLING AT THE PROBLEMS OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE*
WALTER PROBERT**
INTRODUCTION

By virtue of mass media dramatization of their insurance plight, physician
lobbies have stimulated in this past year some measure of response from
numerous legislatures across the country.' In some instances, action was
merely token in creating a study commission. 2 In others, action was narrowed
to what was the immediate crisis - the need to provide for some sort of
backup in the face of insurance company threats of actual withdrawal from
a state.3 The Florida Legislature took both of these steps and several others,
providing a hodgepodge package that was at least one of the most varied in
the land. The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 19754 attempts changes
in both the substance and procedure of malpractice law and in the regulatory practices relating to physicians and other health care providers. 5
This analysis will be concerned mainly with the provisions of the Florida
Reform Act that are aimed at the law of informed consent, contractual
guarantees, and the time limitations on the filing of suit. 6 Whether another
provision making a mandatory screening panel a condition to filing suit
will be anything more than expensive and irritating must remain to be
*The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance provided by Allen Rainey.
**B.S. 1949, J.D. 1951, University of Oregon; J.S.D. 1957, Yale University; Professor of
Law and Medicine, University of Florida.
1. A summary chart of legislative response in 36 states appears in 16 MEDICAL WORLD
NEWS 80, 83 (July 28, 1975) [hereinafter cited as NEws]. See Miike, State Legislatures Address
the Medical Malpractice Suit, 3 J. LEG. MED. 25 (1975).
2. E.g., Colorado, Connecticut, and Kansas; in all, 19 states took this step. NEWS,
supra note 1.
3. E.g., Georgia and Hawaii; 19 states are reported as providing for a joint underwriters' association. Id.
4. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9.
5. Other varied approaches are to be found in Indiana, Louisiana, and Oregon. See
NEws, supra note I, at 83. Idaho and Illinois placed a limit on physician liability of
$150,000 and $500,000, respectively. Several states followed the lead of New Jersey in placing
a sliding scale limit on lawyers' fees, for example, 40% on the first $5,000, 33 1/3% on
the next $45,000, 20% on the next $50,000, and 10% on the amount in excess of $100,000.
In California there has been a movement from lump sum to periodic payments for "future
damages" in judgments. CAL. CODE CiV. PRO. §667.7 (West Supp. 1975); NEws supra
note 1, at 83.
6. A number of other sections are included, such as those: providing for compulsory
"medical liability mediation panels in each judicial circuit"; increasing disciplinary and
quality controls in the State Board of Medical Examiners and in hospitals; restricting the
ad damnum clause to the statement of special damages; and a variety of sections pertaining
to the insurance mechanism, including the establishment of a joint underwriting association and power in the Depariment of Insurance to approve programs of self-insurance
among a group of physicians or health care facilities. All these and others are succinctly indexed in the title to the Reform Act. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9.
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seen. 7 Brief comment should be made of regulatory provisions in this big
but seemingly lightweight package, for they may ultimately have meaningful
impact.
REGULATORY PROVISIONS

The Reform Act adds to the disciplinary powers of both the Florida
Board of Medical Examiners8 and the medical staff of any hospital "licensed
pursuant to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes."9 Further, such hospitals having
in excess of 300 beds are required by the Reform Act to establish "an internal
risk management program."' 1 Since the principal source of the malpractice
crisis is malpractice, any effective tightening of overall discipline or hospital
management of medical practices is bound to be helpful. Yet the Reform Act
itself does little but encourage supervision, although conceivably a hospital
could lose its license for non-compliance. Added inspiration may come from
the judicial theory that a hospital may be liable in negligence for patient
mishap stemming from its failure to supervise and coordinate hospital and
medical staff practices. This theory was generated by the Illinois case of
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital.", Thus, violation of a
statutory duty by whomever is held responsible within the hospital community 2 can be negligence per se, 3 and failure by the hospital to exercise
an authority of discipline may provide a basis for judicially imposed liability
under the Darling theory.' 4
FLORIDA MEDICAL CONSENT LAW

General Effect
Fully developed, the theory of informed consent assumes that patients
should have a sound basis for choice and decision in medical situations. The
physician may advise and recommend, but he may not decide for the patient
who wishes to decide for himself. The theory also tends to bring the medical
profession more fully under the developing tort policies, which would impose
the economic risk aspects of personal injuries on those who are the superior
risk bearers, risk spreaders, or accident avoiders. The theory recognizes that
the physician may shift the risks of side effects that are present, even if nonnegligent treatment is provided, onto the patient simply by informing him

7. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §5, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.133.
8. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §12, amending FLA. STAT. §458.1201.
9. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §13, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §395.065.
10. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §3, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §395.18.
11. 33 IM. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
12. Responsibility for carrying out the administration of the internal risk management program is not pinpointed in §3 of the Reform Act. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §3 to
be codified as FLA. STAT. §395.18.
13. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
14. Commentary, Hospital Liability for the Negligence of Physicians: Some Needed
Legal Sutures, 26 U. FLA. L. REv. 844 (1974) (discussion of the Darling theory in the Florida
context).
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of all the substantial risks of careful treatment. The patient who is thus
informed and nevertheless consents to treatment does not thereby consent to
the side effect if it occurs, but he has no legal recourse, in effect having assumed the risk.
When read with that understanding, as it must be, the new Florida medical
consent law, 16 as a statutory amendment to the common law, turns out to
be at most a mild limitation on the continuing development of informed
consent in Florida. It provides an immunity against suit brought for "treating . . . a patient without his [alleged] informed consent . . ."1. if certain
18
conditions are met: (1) if the physician obtains consent in a manner that
is "in accordance with an accepted standard of medical practice" and (2) if
"a reasonable individual" would thus "have a general understanding" of the
9
proposed procedure, substantial inherent risks, and alternatives.- An alternative condition of immunity provided for in the statute is one already
routine in the common law: Even if the patient is not informed as stated, if
he reasonably would have proceeded had he been so informed, the physician
is immune. 20 Perhaps most importantly, the statutory amendment raises questions about the nature of medical standards and of standards of reasonableness
involved in communications between physicians and patients. These matters
need some explanation against the context of the developing common law in
Florida and across the United States.

Common Law Context
The medical consent law is an amendment, an attempted influence on
a fast moving bit of contemporary common law. The statutory amendment
will be interpreted against the current trend, not just the history of informed consent theory. As a political matter, in the sense of legislative history,
it is the current trend that produced this piece of legislation in Florida.
The evolution of informed consent in the malpractice area involves two
closely interrelated key developments. First, on the surface is the movement
from the question whether plaintiff actually consented to treatment to
the question whether he was reasonably informed of the inherent risks of
treatment. In most situations, validity of consent is no longer an issue. Second
15. A "side effect" is one not due to design or negligence of the physician, such as
possible allergic reaction to a particular medicine or the possibilities of infection, paralysis,
or even death that are inherent risks of various diagnostic and operative procedures. Whether
the physician must inform the patient of a given risk to shift it to the patient depends
on whether it is "substantial." D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE §22.09
(1973) [hereinafter cited as LOUIsELL].
16. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §11, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132.
17. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §11(3), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3).
18. Section 768.132 embraces physicians, osteopaths, chiropractors, podiatrists, and
dentists, who are licensed to practice in Florida. The textual references to "physicians"
should be read accordingly. Note that this list is not consistent throughout the Reform Act.
19. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §ll(3)(a), (b), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3)(a),

(b). These two conditions are conjunctive, not disjunctive, as discussed in text accompanying
notes 42-43 infra.
20. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §11(3)(c), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3)(c).
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and more controversial has been definition of the role of the medical expert
witness. Judicial treatment of this factor is pivotal in the entire medical malpractice litigational scene; that element, not validity of consent, is really
the driving force in the current trend of informed consent theory.
As will be elaborated, at first, plaintiff was not required to produce expert
testimony because consent was treated as the key issue. 2 1 Then courts came
to require such testimony because the reasonableness of the physician's communications with the patient seemed the essential concern. Currently, the
decided national trend is to free the plaintiff of this requirement since judgment on this matter is no longer seen as esoterically a medical prerogative."
How the statutory amendment will be judged by the Florida courts turns
on what the statute has to say on the role of the medical expert and the criteria
of reasonableness in informed consent cases. In its earliest stages, informed
consent theory was associated with battery concepts instead of negligence
theory as it now is. Then the jury question was whether the plaintiff consented to the treatment that produced the injury. If so, there was no battery.
The underlying question, however, was whether consent had been induced
by misinformation or lack of information. A positive answer to the latter
question meant that although there was consent" it was not to count. Invalidating consent in this way was analogous to invalidating consent induced by fraud. Such an analogy was attractive, because generally the patient
had been misled, usually unintentionally, in the lack of informed consent
situation.
As in any battery case, no expert testimony was thought necessary on the
question of consent.' 4 This made the battery concept attractive to plaintiff's
attorneys because of the opportunity to focus on the consent issue rather than
on medical standards. Medical expertise on the question of what is misleading
in these cases is difficult to envisage or to find because a medical science
standard, is not really involved, as it is in the more frequent situation of
claimed negligence in treatment.
Subsequently, even though courts might realistically have moved to a
theory of misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary duty,25 their approach
shifted to negligence theory because of a combination of factors. The first
point, critical to the understanding of the theory's evolution and the statutory
amendment's construction is that validity of consent is at best a tangential
•issue. These are not cases of unauthorized treatment. The claim is that de21.

LoUISELL, supra

note 15, §22.01; Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 1084.

22. See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
23. Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900); PRossR,

LAw

oF ToRTS ch. 4,

§18 at 105 (4th ed. 1971).
-24. For discussion of the early stage, see LOuSsELL, supra note 15, §22.01; Stewart, The
Duty of Obtaining Medical Consent, 48 FLA. B.J. 614 (1974); Comment, New Trends in
Informed Consent?, 54 NEB. L. Rxv. 66, 67-72 (1975).
25. The basis of the physician's duty is often characterized in terms of a fiduciary relationship with the patient; even though the negligence doctrine is used. Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wash. App. 899,
484 P.2d 1162 (App. Div. 1971); Stewart, supra note 24; Curran & Moseley, The Malpractice
Experience of Health Maintenance Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 69, 71, 75 (1975).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss1/2

4

Probert: Nibbling at the Problems of Medical Malpractice

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVlIII

fendant wrongly caused plaintiff to suffer an injury. True, plaintiff argues
he would not have consented had he known the risks incident to treatment,
but that is part of the causal issue. He has consented and therefore he is
not suing because the operation or treatment itself was unauthorized, say
amputation of the wrong leg, dosage with the wrong medicine, or delivery
by a ghost obstetrician. Instead he is suing for the injury that resulted because he was not adequately informed, such as the occurrence of the side
effect of paralysis from a diagnostic test.26 Thus, consent in the catch phrase
"informed consent" is a misnomer, and battery theory is entirely inappro27
priate to sound administration of the problem area.
There were other factors bearing on the shift to negligence theory. One
of them no doubt was the judicial belief that juries ought to play a larger
role in evaluating the adequacy of the physician's communication to the
plaintiff; under battery theory, it was a judicial question. But negligence theory
brought its own confusions to the problem area. Courts were caught up in
the historical belief that a negligence claim against a physician required
plaintiff's expert witness to attest to the level of competence of defendant's
diagnosis, operational technique, or other treatment, even though the "informed consent" cases were dealing with the adequacy of the patient's understanding, not with competence of treatment.
It remains to be seen how courts will respond in this area given the
publicity of the malpractice insurance crisis, but the current and decided
national trend is to treat the "informed consent" cases differently from other
negligence claims and to free the plaintiff from the necessity of producing
an expert to testify to the "community standard" of disclosure. 2 The labels
"informed consent" and "negligence" may still be the same, but the focus is on
the physician-patient relationship29 rather than on the existence of consent
or on usually nonexistent community standards. The question is: Whose decision is it whether the patient shall take the risk of hazards incident to the
26. See note 15 supra.
27. McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN.
L. REv. 381 (1957); LoUISELL, supra note 15, §22.08.

28. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, cert. denied,
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr.
212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d 539 (1973) (element of deception;
of defendant to disclose any risks shifts burden to prove

409 U.S. 1064 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
505 (1972); Funke v. Fieldman,
earlier Kansas case held failure
medical standard); Natanson v.

Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093, rehearing denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960);

Fogel v. Genesee Hospital, 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't 1973); Congrove v. Holmes, 37 Ohio Misc. 95, 308 N.E.2d 765 (C.P. Ross County 1973); Martin N.
Stratton, 515 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1973) (proof of negligence does not require an expert, but
affirmative proof of a medical standard violation does); Holland v. Sisters of Saint Joseph
of Peace, 522 P.2d 208, vacated on other grounds, 526 P.2d 577 (Ore. 1974) (and thus only
probable); Cooper v. Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Wilkinson v. Vesey,
110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972); Nelson v. Mueller, 85 Wash. 2d 234, 533 P.2d 383 (1975)
(probable); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973). For a general
analysis see LouISELL, supra nole 15, §22.01.
29. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the leading case in the
trend, saying: "While we recognize the general utility of shorthand phrases in literary
expositions, we caution that uncritical use of the 'informed consent' label can be misleading." Id. at 780, n.15.
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recommended treatment? Although the trend presently favors patient
autonomy at least in decisions regarding substantial risks, the next phase
nationally could well be strict liability rather than a negligence base for
failure to disclose significant risks incident to treatment.3 0 The threat of this
phase quite dearly explains the motivation for passage of the Florida medical
consent law. Florida's statutory amendment probably confines local development of "informed consent" within the boundaries of negligence theory, yet
even it opts for a policy favoring a reasonable effort by the physician to communicate such risks to the patient, regardless of whether there is said to be a
contrary medical practice. 31
In Florida, the common law of "informed consent" is relatively undeveloped. Negligence theory seems to have been established as the preferred
judicial approach,3 2 and it may certainly be argued that expert testimony
is essential to support a plaintiff's claim of negligent communication,33 but
the supreme court has not yet spoken on these matters. Thus, without legislative intervention, there was a relatively free road in the direction of the
national trend, had our judiciary chosen to take it.
The Statutory Amendment
Medical Standards. Since the statutory amendment has no effect on the
previous Florida case law in the area, the best analytical approach is to
consider how free the Florida courts are to pursue the national trend under
this legislation, which, remember, provides an area of immunity from judicial
intervention. In other words, this legislation places a limit on the duty that
the judiciary may impose on physicians, but it has nothing to say, except
by implication in its drawing of a line, on how far the judiciary should go
in approaching the area of immunity, the limit on duty. 34
The first of the two prerequisites to immunity is that:
(3)(a) The action of the physician ... in obtaining the consent of the
patient . ..was in accordance with an accepted standard of medical
30. There has been talk of strict liability for physicians. See Chait, Continuing the Common Law Response to the New Industrial State, the Extension of Enterprise Liability to
Consumer Services, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 401 (1975). The potential is visible in Davis v.
Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (reasonable failure by distributor of
polio vaccine to warn of known risk). In Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981
(1974), three concurring judges alluded to strict liability as a possible base if needed to
"offer reasonable protection to the plaintiff."
31. See discussion in the section of Statutory Standards accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
32. Zaretsky v. Jacobson, 99 So. 2d 730 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958); O'Grady v. Wickman, 213
So. 2d 321 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1968); Brown v. Wood, 202 So. 2d 125 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967),
where negligence theory was involved, although at plaintiffs' behest in the latter two
cases to take advantage of a longer period of limitations on suit. See a general discussion
of the Florida situation in Stewart, supra note 24.
33. Ditlow v. Kaplan, 181 So. 2d 226 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
34. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §1l(3)(a), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3) reads:
"No recovery shall be allowed in any court in this state against any physician . . . in an
action brought for treating, examining, or operating on a patient without his informed
consent where ...... (followed by the oi'jtips pf immunity).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss1/2

6

Probert: Nibbling at the Problems of Medical Malpractice

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

practice among members of the medical profession with similar training
and experience in the same or similar medical community . . .3
Suppose this were the only prerequisite to immunity. Apparently it places
the burden of proof on the defendant to prove he acted in accordance with
a community standard, probably by expert testimony. It places no requirement on the essentials of plaintiff's prima facie case; therefore, the Florida
courts remain free to follow the national trend, which does not require
plaintiff's production of expert testimony. The trend is based on the policy
view that the ultimate decision on treatment is the patient's, at least if he
wishes to make it, and that he should have a reasonable basis of information
to consider. Whether he had such information and whether he was reasonable
in his decision is not regarded as a medical question."
As a corollary to this view, it is felt that there are probably few professionally shared standards of communication and certainly very few that
are scientifically based - in the sense that techniques of diagnosis, prescription, and operation are.3 7 If the Florida courts take a hard look at this
question, they may feel compelled to follow the national leads, for there is
nothing in the first prerequisite to immunity preventing it. The first prerequisite calls for proof of an accepted standard of medical practice, but sets
forth no criteria for identifying such standards nor requirements of proving
such standards should they be identifiable. At the other end of the spectrum
of possibilities, the courts could take the view that testimony from a colleague in defendant's specialty conclusively establishes a standard of medical
practice. Rarely would such a conclusion be supportable in medical textbooks
or be a suitable project for scientific investigation and affirmation.
Thus, on the defendant's side of the case, evidence from an appropriate
physician should continue to be admissible, subject to evaluation for
credibility but not conclusive on the community standard issue. On the
plaintiff's side, it continues to be a matter for judicial determination whether
patients have a right to be reasonably informed and whether either generally
or in specific cases medical opinion has any relevance to that determination.38 The practical effect is that if the Florida courts follow the old view,

35. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §l1(3)(a), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3)(2).
36. "The patient's right to make up his mind should not be delegated to a local
medical group . . ." Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676 (1972): Comment,
Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1396, 1404 (1967).
37. This view was strongly stated in Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104
Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972), indicating, as to risks not of a serious and material nature, that
plaintiff would need to establish an existing favorable medical standard.
38. The decision in a particular case that a physician has been negligent, whether in
respect to failure to give adequate information to the patient or on some other basis, may
be within the prerogative of the jury without expert assistance under the "common
knowledge" exception. See Hastings, When the Doctor Runs a Red Light, 46 FLA. B.J. 32,
33 (1972). This is followed even against defendant's proffer of expert evidence of a truly
existent medical standard. The leading case establishing the ultimate judicial prerogatives
against any customary practice, The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) was recently
applied in a medical malpractice situation in Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d
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plaintiff will need a doctor who thinks the relevant risks should have been
disclosed. If the national trend is followed, such an "expert" is not necessary
to the prima facie case. If, however, defendant has produced testimony to
support proof of both this and the second prerequisites to immunity under
the statutory amendment, then plaintiff will have to produce his own expert
or else take a substantial risk of a directed verdict against him.
Statutory Standards. The second of the two prerequisites to immunity
is that:
(3)(b) A reasonable individual from the information provided by the
physician . ..under the circumstances would have a general understanding of the procedure and the medically acceptable alternative
procedures or treatments and substantial risks and hazards inherent in
the proposed treatment or procedures which are recognized among
other physicians ....
39
Thus, it is not enough for a defendant physician to prove he abided by a
medical standard in his communication, he must also prove that the patient
was "reasonably" informed as set forth. Whether the patient has been
reasonably informed depends on what kind of information as well as what
level of understanding is required. The statutory standard seems generally
in line with the national trend with regard to kinds of information,4° but-it
is not at all clear what import the statute will have regarding the standard of
evaluation of the patient's necessary understanding. Of course, as a matter
of evidentiary pragmatism, it is not sufficient to base the judgment of
adequacy on the patient's recall alone.
The most acceptable approach would be to gauge the communication in
light of the patient's capacity to comprehend what he was told, but certainly
not in terms of some fictional reasonable person who may be conceived to
have had an average education and life experience. The test should not be
"objective" to the point of ignoring the particular physician-patient realities.41
Of course, any test of reasonableness usually provides a jury question, thus
often it may not matter what level of reasonableness confronts us in the
981 (1974). Analyzed in Comment, Physicians & Surgeons -

Standard of Care, 28

VAND.

L.

REV.441 (1975).
39. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §1l(3)(b), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(3)(b).
40. There is no requirement that the physician's communication give heed to the
risks of non-treatment nor is concern reflected in the statute for the impact of physician
overassurance. For matters to be discussed by physicians see Bowers v. Talmadge, 159 So. 2d
888 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); LOMUSELL supra note 15, §22.09; Stewart, supra note 24, at 618.
41. Discussion of the standard of reasonableness in physician-patient communication
has tended to focus on the "materiality" of the undisclosed risks rather than on the
plaintiff's capacity to understand. See Comment, Cooper v. Roberts: A "Reasonable Patient"
Test for Informed Consent, 34 U. Prrr. L. Ray. 500 (1973); Comment, New Trends in

Informed Consent, 54 NE. L. REv. 66 (1975). The standard of reasonableness should be
compared to the assumption of risk doctrine if there is a greater degree of subjectivity qua
plaintiff's probable understanding, as in Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 II1. 2d 418, 216
N.E.2d 305 (1970); PaossER, LAW OF ToRTs ch. 5, §22, at 165-66 (4th ed. 1971), although
the standard should not be so subjective as to rely simply on plaintiff's self-serving recall.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol28/iss1/2

8

Probert: Nibbling at the Problems of Medical Malpractice

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII

statutory standard in question. Still it is important to contemplate the question for the purpose of jury instruction drafting and appellate review.
The phrasing of the second prerequisite to immunity is definitely equivocal
as it stands - when viewed out of its context. It could be saying "ignore the
particular patient in judging the reasonableness"; it could be saying "consider the reasonable individual in the patient's shoes." At this point the
next subsection of the statutory amendment seems to throw light on the
question. It provides the alternative prerequisite to immunity as follows, that:
(3)(c) The patient would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances, have undergone such treatment or procedure had he been
advised by the physician ... in accordance
with the provisions of para42
graph (a) and (b) of this section.

This section addresses the materiality of the undisclosed risk.
Since its wording on the materiality question is phrased in a clearly appropriate subjective vein ("[t]he patient"), and since it is different phrasing
from the standard of subsection (b) ("[a] reasonable individual"), the latter
standard seems less subjective if not completely objective. Yet there is that
last turn of the screw, "in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (a)
and (b) of this section." In one turn, this clause affirms that the first two
stated prerequisites are joint, not several, and also suggests that the wording
of subsection (b) was ill-considered. To see this point requires merely that
the interpreter substitute the wording of subsections (a) and (b) in place
of those bracketed letters in the last clause of subsection (c). As awkward as
this instruction may be to follow, the resulting wording is absurd. The effect
of it is to say that the physician will be immune if the patient reasonably
would have elected the recommended treatment had he been informed on the
level of information that a reasonable individual would have comprehended,
even if the patient did not have the capacity for understanding of a reasonable individual. Given this confused draftsmanship, the best that can be
said is that an ambiguity has been created calling for resolution by the
Florida courts in favor of a standard of communication that is geared to the
realities of each physician-patient relationship.
Privilege to Withhold Information. Although the statutory amendment
places a limit on the duty the courts can place on physicians, it does not
impose a mandatory duty on physicians. Still, the courts could reflect from
the limitation a preferred policy by which to measure physician communications. The medical profession itself could work to establish sound standards
of communication, with the statute as a goal for minimal achievement. In
such events, the statute is flawed in failing to recognize that there are situations when physicians should be privileged to withhold information for the
sake of sound therapeutic treatment. Even the emerging trend's view on
42.

Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §I1(3)(c), to be codified as

FLA. STAT.

§768.132(3)(c). Some

writers refer to this test as "objective." E.g., LoUISELL supra note 15, §22.04; Comment. Cooper v. Roberts: A "Reasonable Patient" Test for Informed Consent, 34 U. PiTr. L. REV. 500
(1973); Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent, 54 NEB. L. REV. 66 (1975).
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"informed consent" agrees that there are situations where medical judgment
should prevail, if the jury agrees with the judgment.43 In these circumstances,
medical standards are more apt to be identifiable, but the statutory amendment's second prerequisite that the patient must be so informed as to have
a general understanding of the relevant risks would ignore the physician's
privilege to withhold information.
The Conclusive Presumption of Valid Consent. One unacquainted with
the evolution of the common law of "informed consent" could easily go astray
in reading the next section of the statutory amendment:
(4)(a) A consent which is evidenced in writing and meets the requirements of subsection (3), shall, if validly signed by the patient . . . be
conclusively presumed to be valid consent .... 44
If the validity of the consent is the basic issue in these cases, then a strictly
physician-oriented court might order a directed verdict for a defendant who
provides one witness testifying in his favor - if the court is also satisfied that
a "reasonable individual" would have gained a general understanding regarding the implications of the recommended treatment, and the patient had
signed a consent form. A court is more likely, however, to leave the question
of medical standard and the patient's understanding to jury reckoning. Such
being the case, the import of this section of the statute would be no more
than guidance to the trial judge in his drafting of an appropriate jury instruction. Of course, the uninformed interpreter might read this section to
require that the defendant receive a directed verdict if he has provided a
written consent and evidence of compliance with sections (3)(a) and (b) of
the amendments, or with section (3)(c).
The more reasonable interpretation follows quite smoothly from the history of the theory of "informed consent" as it has been narrated here. One
need not even consider the most recent trend of decisions. Validity of consent is not the issue where the claim is in negligence for failing to give the
patient reasonably adequate information and thus for causing him injury to
which he has quite clearly not consented, and the risk of which he has not
assumed. 45 Also, this section is irrelevant to the question of whether the
patient assumed the risk of injury. This section and consent are relevant,
however, if the plaintiff attempts to go back in time to base his claim on
the theory of battery. 46 Plaintiffs' attorneys might well have taken that tack
had the legislature not judiciously closed it off. Certainly the section is rele43. See discussion in Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent, 54 Nmz. L. REv. 66,
87-88 (1975); Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (privilege to withhold

information of risk of paralysis inherent in thoracic aortography for suspected aneurysm
upheld where conveyance of such information was contraindicated because of patient
hypertension); Schroeder, Cardiac Catheterization and Informed Consent, 53 POSTRADUATE
MEDIcINE 207, March 1973; Lalli, Urographic Contrast Media Reactions and Anxiety, 112
RADIOLOGY

267 (1974).

44. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §11(4)(a), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(4)(a).
45. For discussion, see section on Common Law Context accompanying notes 21-31 supra.
46. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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vant if the question concerns the patient's alleged understanding and authorization of the recommended operation and does not involve the issue of "side
effects." Then a signed consent form backed by a communication that
touches the bases as enumerated in the statutory amendment should be con4
clusive, unless there is fraud. 7
ASSURANCES OF CURE

A few years ago the Michigan Supreme Court decided Guilmet v. Campbell 45 and allowed an action in contract for physician overassurances regarding
the results of an operation. The impact in Florida of this decision was the
passage of a section of the Reform Act to amend the Statute of Frauds. 49 Now,
in Florida, the plaintiff must apparently produce an appropriate written instrument to make a claim against a physician or other named health care
providers on a theory of "guarantee, warranty, or assurance as to the results"
of medical treatment. 50
Of all the provisions of the Reform Act, this is without doubt the least
justified. The Guilmet decision provided relief under contract theory in a
case where the theory of lack of "informed consent" would have sufficed. Defendant physicians had assured plaintiff of a speedy and thorough recovery
from a gastric resection to remedy a bleeding ulcer. The resulting disastrous
consequences were apparently known risks of the operation and were not
caused by negligence in technique. However, the operation in question is
hardly one to restore a patient to a normal life. It was a case of overselling
the operation, plain and simple, or else irresponsible "bedside manner" in
reassuring the patient.51 The theory of negligence would be preferable for
such a case because no expert testimony would be necessary under such circumstances, 52 and the malpractice insurance contract would indemnify the
defendant for negligence whereas it would not for breach of contract. Fur47. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §11(4)(a), to be codified as FLA. STAT. §768.132(4)(a) provides: "This presumption may be rebutted if there was fraudulent misrepresentation of a
material fact in obtaining the signature."
48. 385 Mich. 57, 188 N.W.2d 601 (1971), discussed in Zaslow, Breach of Contract in
Medical Malpractice - A New Dilemma, I J. LEc. MED. 14 (1973); Tierney, Contractual
Aspects of Malpractice, 19 WAYNE L. REv. 1457

(1973).

49. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §10, amending FLA. STAT. §725.01.
50. The Florida Statute of Frauds requires written support for proof of alleged agreement on a variety of matters, including now one "to charge any health care provider upon
any guarantee, warranty or assurance as to the results of any medical, surgical or diagnostic
procedure, performed by" a licensed physician, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist, or
dentist. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9. §10, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §725.01.
51. See also Jackson v. Anderson, 230 So. 2d 503 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1970) (breach of contract for unsuccessful sterilization and resulting pregnancy); Sullivan v. O'Connor, 296 N.E.2d
183 (Mass. 1973) (plastic surgery failing to achieve promised results; pain and suffering
damages allowed under contract theory). See generally 43 A.L.R. 3d 1221 (1972). Lack of
informed consent cases might well have gone the contract route, had tort measures of
damages been obtainable, on the theory of a breach of the physician-patient relationship;
see note 25 supra.
52. The theory of negligence would be preferable, even if a court required an expert
in the usual "informed consent" cases, e.g., Funke v. Fieldman, 212 Kan. 524, 512 P.2d
539 (1973); Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1975

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [1975], Art. 2
1975]

PROBLEMS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

thermore, contract theory does not provide the physician with a basis for
arguing a privileged situation of the sort that might have been involved in
Guilmet.53 Also, if the patient were confronted with a life or death situation,
the "informed consent" approach permits proof that information of risk of
unwanted consequences would not have been material in the patient's decision. Given all of that, a case of oversell might still be regarded as
negligence.5 4
The statutory remedy is unfortunate. It does not prevent recovery where
there is overassurance. It was not needed because the physician's remedy was
simple: obtain a consent form explicitly stating that cure is not guaranteed.
The legislature might have made that type of evidence conclusive on the
contract issue. To throw the burden on the patient to bbtain a written
promise is totally unrealistic and no less than protection for unscrupulous
health care providers. Few patients will have obtained a written instrument
even where assurance is given orally, either because the health care provider's office hardly seems a place of business or because he is unlikely to accede
to such a request. A physician may, without fraud but with firm conviction,
give assurance that a sterilization operation will be effective, that an operation
will not leave a scar, or that treatment will definitely improve the patient's
condition. 55 Perhaps the judicial response should be to treat this situation,
too, as one of lack of "informed consent," in this instance failure to inform
of the risks of failure, even though this is not the typical situation where
the theory has prevailed. The other judicial route is to hold that the Statute
of Frauds should not be an avenue to the perpetration of fraud.56
STATuTE OF LrMiTATIONS

The Amendment in HistoricalPerspective
The Reform Act adds a provision in the statutes of limitation.5

that

53. See earlier text on Privilege to Withhold Information accompanying note 43 supra.
54. See note 40 supra.

55. Presumably these are situations where a writing would now be required. The
Statute of Frauds amendment hardly covers all contract situations, however. See, e.g., Anclote
Manor Foundation v. Wilkinson, 263 So. 2d 256 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1972) (psychiatrist's liability
for reimbursement of fees for unorthodox behavior). Other examples would include failure

to appear for delivery of baby, to perform promised operation, or to give promised tests;
ghost surgery; and abandonment of the patient. Current literature on the subject includes,
Recent Developments, Torts - Medical Malpractice - Express Warranty of ParticularResults of an Operation, 41 TENN. L. REy. 964 (1974); Note, Express Contract to Cure: The
Nature of ContractualMalpractice,50 IND. LJ. 361 (1965); Comment, Establishing the Contractual Liability of Physicians, 7 U. CAL. DAvis L. REv. 84 (1974); Comment, Contractual
Liability in Medical Malpractice,24 DEPAUL L. REv. 212 (1974).

56. "[Tjhe statute itself was passed for the prevention of fraud and it would be shocking to allow the statute to defeat its own purpose." 2 A. CORBIN, CoNTRACrS 469 (1950). See,
e.g., Todd v. Hyzer, 154 Fla. 702, 18 So. 2d 888 (1944); Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 115 Fla.
21, 155 So. 136 (1934). The court, however, will not allow the use of fraud theory in
tort to escape the purpose of the statute of frauds - to prevent suit on allegations of oral
promise where there has been no performance whatsoever by defendants. Conell v. Arcola
Housing Corp, 65 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1953); Ostman v. Lawn, 305 So. 2d 871 (3d D.C.A. Fla.

1974).
57. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §7, amending FLA.
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applies exclusively to an "action for medical malpractice" against "any provider of health care. ' '5 As before amendment, it applies to both tort and
contract claims s 9
The amendment is a response to claims by insurance companies that
open-ended limits, like Florida's previous "discovery" approach, necessitated
large reserves against the contingency of undiscovered claims and thus
contributed significantly to skyrocketing claims.6 The amendment smells
of compromise and suggests some doubting legislators. The result is a tangle
that may itself require a contingency reserve against future judicial interpretations.
In 1973 the limitation was two years, running from the time of reasonable discoverability of the injury.61 In 1974 all professional malpractice actions were brought under the same umbrella, running two years from the
reasonable discoverability of the cause of action.52 The effect was to lengthen
the "long tail"6 3 further on the apparent theory that awareness of injury or
disability was not necessarily awareness that it may have resulted from
medical negligence or other breach. The 1975 amendment appears to continue this broadened discovery approach but places a cap on it for medical
malpractice claims only, by providing that, at a maximum, a cause of action
will lapse within four years of its accrual. The period may, but not necessarily,
6
run longer if there is fraud preventing discovery of the injury. 4
Logic alone cannot solve the riddles of the amendment's wording. The
Florida courts will have to weigh the usual conflicting values involved in
calculating appropriate limits for claims.6 5 Sooner or later, the question will
58. "Provider of health care" is not defined. Thus it could also apply to hospitals
or health maintenance organizations, as well as to those persons defined in other sections
of the Reform Act treated in this article; see notes 18 and 19 supra. Previously FLA. STAT.
§95.11(4)(a) applied to all actions for professional malpractice. That section has been
amended so that it no longer applies to medical malpractice. Section 95.11(4)(b) has been
added and applies exclusively to medical malpractice.
59. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §7, amending FLA. STAT. §95.11(4). To make sure the provision is exclusive, it is phrased to be applicable to claims "for damages because of death,
injury, or monetary loss to any person arising out of any medical, dental or surgical diagnosis,
treatment, or care." The quoted provision provides some interpretative problems with
respect to the term "medical," but presumably the term is as broad as the coverage of the
Florida Medical Consent Law, previously discussed.

60. See discussion in HEW,

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MAL-

PRACTICE 41-42 (1973). Others have suggested that bad investment practices had depleted
reserves, American Medical News, February 2, 1976, at 9, col. I. See implicit admission by
insurance industry representatives in Subcommittee Print, National Conference on Medical
Malpractice, #54-690, printed for use of Subcommittee on Health and the Environment, at
13 (1975).
61. FLA. STAT. §95.11(4) (1973), discussed in Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1975) discussing earlier key Florida cases, including City of Miami v. Brooks, 70 So. 2d 306
(Fla. 1954), an early case in the judicial development of the discovery approach in Florida.

62.

FLA. STAT.

§95.11(4)(a) (Supp. 1974).

63. "Long tail" refers to the representation on a graph of the period it takes for the
filing of all claims relating to a given year.
64. See text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.
65. Such as, the problems of "stale" lawsuits involving missing witnesses, documents,
and otser evidence; errors in memory; and implicit invitation to fraud and perjury. Also
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arise whether barring a person from his chance at compensation before he
could reasonably know he had a chance is ever justified. One thing is clear:
the amendment reflects a legislative purpose to move Florida back from its
position among the most liberal of states. 60 Understandably, the judicial
response may be to hold so much of the ground as is not clearly taken away.
Analysis
The amendment's turns and twists in syntax should be enough to please
any aficionado of mathematical puzzles and internal revenue regulations. Yet
it does unravel against its history to provide a period of limitations of two
years beginning at the point of reasonable discoverability of the cause of action. This is just as its predecessor, but with the outer limit of four years
from the point of accrual of the cause of action. How much easier it would
have been to say that rather than the following:
(4)(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within two
years from the time the incident occurred giving rise to the action,
or within two years from the time the incident is discovered, or should
have been discovered with due diligence, provided however, that in no
event shall the action be commenced later than four years from the date
67
of the incident or occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.
Right off comes the bothersome phrase, "incident giving rise to the action." Does it refer to the physician's breach? A contract breach "gives rise
to the action," but a tort breach does not necessarily. Does "gives rise to
the action" require a notion of legal causation that refers to the last event
perfecting the claim, so that the incident in question defines the point at
which the cause of action accrues? Presumably "gives rise to the action" is a
concept distinct from "accrual," which is used later in the quoted statutory
sentence to define the four year maximum period.
In many instances the wording does not matter. If the action is in contract, breach and accrual occur simultaneously. 68 A tort claim often will accrue
practically at the moment of breach as well, because the unauthorized bodily
contact or the negligently caused injury that is necessary to perfect the
respective claims of battery or negligence will follow immediately on breach.
Even in these dear situations of either contract or tort, whether for misdiagnosis, faulty prescription, or other substandard techniques or practices,
the commencement of the two year period is contingent on actual discovery
involved is the general preference for putting potentialities of conflict to rest. See Comment,
1 HorsrRA L. REV. 276 (1973). The limitations problem in the medical malpractice context has presented particular concern for patients in situations where the cause of injury
or "unfortunate consequences" is especially difficult to trace. The instant amendment presumably adds actuarial concerns to the balance.
66. The national situation prior to 1975 legislative changes is charted in LouxsnEL, supra
note 15, ch. XIII, listing 29 jurisdictions using some variation of the discovery approach and
12 using a "time of the act" approach. See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1960).
67. Fla. Laws 75-9, §7 (4)(b), amending FLA. STAT. §95.11(4)(b) (Supp. 1974).
68. Fradley v. County of Dade, 187 So. 2d 48 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1966); LouIsELL, supra
note 15, §§13.07, 13.11.
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or reasonable discoverability of "the incident giving rise to the action," subject to defeasance after four years from the same point. Thus, in the clear
situations, there is a four year outer period with a two year inner accordion.
The phrase, "incident giving rise to the action," is troublesome in a
tort claim if the persona[ injury caused by the breach is separated from
the breach by a significant period of time. It will be troublesome even if the
personal injury occurs immediately on breach, if, for instance, the patient is
aware of the injury at some later point, but not aware of the cause - the
original incident of physician breach of duty. Since the two year inner period
does not commence until discovery of the "incident giving rise to the action,"
it makes a difference whether that incident is the original breach or the personal injury. There are all manner of situations in which this issue will be
present, for the medical treatment area is particularly subject to doubt on
the part of both physician and patient as to the causes of patient distress or
disability. If a patient receives an appendectomy and later suffers continuing
pains, the possibilities are many, but the "foreign object" left in the patient
during the operation may be the least likely to be suspected by either
physician or patient. Misdiagnosis or excessive radiation may not be harmful
or evident for many years. Awareness of pain or other distress does not always
pinpoint the physiological cause. Discovery of the physiological cause does
not always disclose the possibility of wrongful conduct on the part of the
physician nor reasonably induce the patient to make a claim, let alone raise
a cogent question. Often the negligent physician himself diagnoses the distress
he caused, a situation hardly conducive to discovery of the prime cause of
the potential claim. G9
Even against these realities, the legislature placed a four year cap on the
longevity of technically actionable claims, regardless of their discoverability.
Given the realities of health care injuries, the legislative retrenchment ought
to be held to reasonable bounds, certainly where the language permits, as it
does here. The legislative history shows awareness of the distinction between
discovery of injury and discovery of the cause of action,-, as does the fraud
exception later in the section. 71 Given the distinctions made in history and
those made in the text of the statute, "incident giving rise to the action" apparently means the incident of breach.
The practical effect of the statute is that discoverability of the cause of
action is critical. If the patient has discovered his injury but not the incident
of breach, he has not discovered the incident necessary to his cause of action.
If he has discovered the incident of breach but the injury has not yet occurred,
there is no cause of action as yet. Presumably the time period was not intended to run before the accrual point.7 2 If he is aware of the incident of
69. LoUssLL, supra note 15, §§13.07, 13.11, especially at 381, n.68.
70. See notes 61-62 supra. See also Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1975)
certifying to the Supreme Court of Florida the meaning of discoverability of "injury"
under the 1973 statute of limitations.
71. See text accompanying notes 76-82 infra.
72. "There can be no action until a right of action is complete, and hence no statute
of limitation can run before that time has come." Sicola v. First National Bank, 404
Pa. 18, 170 A.2d 584 (1961); Bourne v. State Bank, 106 Fla. 46, 142 So. 810 (1932); but
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breach, but not of an internal injury, again he is not aware of the incident
necessary to his cause of action, although the four year maximum is now
running, subject to defeasance by an earlier point of reasonable discoverability. 73
The action most likely to test these conclusions is for wrongful death, one
of the kinds of claims explicitly embraced by the amendment. A patient could
be injured through a physician's negligence such that he is aware of his
claim, yet he may not have pursued that claim. Or even more likely, he had
a claim and had not discovered it, although with due diligence he would
have. Death may then occur, stemming from the original negligence. Did
the time period on that action commence at the point of reasonable discoverability of the incident of breach? Ordinarily no such question would
seem reasonable, since the claim for wrongful death accrues at death and
is maintainable for the benefit of the survivors, although its existence depends on the decedent's theoretical right to have made a claim on his own
behalf had he survived.7 4 However, the Florida wrongful death action is
something of a hybrid, combining elements of damages recognized under
the previous theory of survival actions as well as old and new elements of
damages for wrongful death.75 Still, the nature and purposes of the claim are
such that one is almost compelled to conclude that the two-year time period
should not commence until death, at the earliest. In turn, consideration of
this sort of claim throws light over the entire amendment to support the conclusion that the effect of its unusual wording ties it to a discovery-of-thecause-of-action approach.
The FraudException
"Where it can be shown that fraud, concealment, or intentional misrepresentation of fact prevented the discovery of injury within the four year
period," then the inner period of limitations is two years from the reasonable
discoverability of the injury and the outer maximum is "seven years from
76
the date the incident giving rise to the injury occurred."
compare the longer period allowed under the fraud exception wherein the outer maximum

period can start running before the accrual of the cause of action, see text accompanying
note 76 infra.
73. The "foreign object" cases present an interpretative problem, whether the four
year outer maximum period, the cap, begins to run at the moment when the object is
wrongly left, or later. See Ayers v. Morgan, 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788 (1959), where a
gauze sponge was not discovered for nine years. Under a "discovery" statute of limitations,
it was held that "injury became a reality when the sponge began to break down healthful
tissue within the body of the plaintiff." Id. at 287, 154 A.2d at 790. In some other situations
the injury point may not be identifiable so that for practical purposes it will be
identified as the moment of discovery.
74. St. Francis Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, 159 Fla. 453, 31 So. 2d 710 (1947) construes
the claim under the previous Florida wrongful death statute as commencing at time of
death. Courts in most other states agree, unless a statute explicitly identifies an earlier
point. See generally Annot., 97 A.L.R. 2d 1151 (1964); LouIsEL, supra note 15, §13.10.
75. FrA. STAT. §§768.16-768.27 (1973).
76. Fla. Laws 75-9, §7(4)(b) amending FLA. STAT. §95.11(4)(b) (emphasis added).
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It would be cumbersome to show that this portion of the amendment
cannot be reconciled with the rest, either in definition or policy. If, for
instance, one wanted to use this portion to show that the spirit of the whole
amendment must be to make discovery of the injury the critical point for
the inner time period in all actions, whether there is fraud or not, then one
would have to explain why the term "injury" was not used previously in
place of "incident . . .giving rise to the action.'"'-

Furthermore, one would

have to supply the reason for tying the outer period of seven years, in the
fraud exception, to the "incident giving rise to the injury," rather than to
the point of accrual of the cause of action or of the original wrongful act.
For most purposes, even though new language-, is involved, the "incident
giving rise to the injury" must be the original wrongful act. As a result,
there will be instances when the plaintiff will not want to claim the fraud
exception. Suppose a misdiagnosis, erroneous drug prescription, or negligent
treatment results in identifiable injury one year later. Assuming the patient
is aware of the injury, he may be prevented by fraud from discovering the
physician's involvement. Since fraud did not prevent him from discovering
the injury itself, he receives no benefit from the fraud exception. Instead, the
general clause is applicable, and he has four years from the date of injury
to discover the connection and sue. Even if discovery of the injury had been
made the key point for all actions, there would be situations where the
fraud exception would be less favorable than the general limits; for instance,
where the injury occurs more than three years after the original error, and
the injury is not discoverable because of fraud.79
The exception will be helpful in many cases when the wrongful act and
the injury occur in close proximity, as in the foreign object cases. The general
clause would subsequently bar action for four years, but in the case of fraud
the period is extended to seven years subject to defeasibility by circumstances
where the injury and the original wrongful act become reasonably discoverable. Yet there is no defensible reason for placing any limit at all
under circumstances of fraud; surely apprehension that the quantity of fraud
cases adds to the costs of insurance premiums is no defense. 0 In some of the
cases, if there is a continuing patient relationship to the errant physician,
continuing failure to provide the correct diagnosis, for instance, may extend
the "incident giving rise to the injury" to the last moment when the injury
might have been prevented. 81 For that matter, cases under the general clause
77. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
78. That is, the shift from the "incident giving rise to the action" to the "incident
giving rise to the injury," contained in Fla. Laws 75-9, §7(4)(b), amending FIA.

STAT.

§95.11(4)(b).
79. Suppose a situation of excessive radiation as of January 1, 1976, and resultant
cancer on January 1, 1980. Under the general limitations period, the patient has until
December 31, 1984, to initiate litigation, but under the fraud exception only until December 31, 1983. See Arnold v. Wooley, 514 P.2d 599 (Idaho 1973) discussing such a
problem where there was a twenty year lag following the excessive radiation.
80. The problem could be handled in the insurance contract by providing for indenmification by the fraudulent physician or even for an exception to coverage.
81. Illustrative of the situation is Helling v. Carey, 88 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974)
(failure to diagnose condition of glaucoma over a period of years). The fraud exception
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may allow interpretation of "the incident giving rise to the action" in the
2
same fashion.
Retroactivity
So long as a reasonable time for filing a petition remains, a legislature3
8
apparently has the power to give retroactive effect to a limitations statute.
The instant amendment, however, contains no "saving clause" 84 nor other
internal recognition of the problem.8 5 Therefore, the judicial response is
likely to be to refuse retroactive application,8 assuming it is possible to determine what nonretroactive application would be. The clearest example
would be to refuse application in any case wherein the "incident giving rise
to the action" occurred prior to the effective date8 7 of the amendment. Presumably, that approach is actuarially sound since insurance premiums should
be assessed on a parallel basis. If previous premiums were tied to estimates
based on physician practices at the time of the contract year, then to tie the
application of the amendment to the accrual of causes of action could be
to provide a windfall to the insurance companies. Since nobody seems to
know just what the actuarial practices have been, it may be just as reasonable,
however, to apply the amendment only to causes accruing after its effective
date, particularly since the design of the amendment seems to give major
significance to the four year period running from the accrual point. Even
though discoverability of the cause of action is still significant, it is within
the limits of that four year period.
CONCLUSION

Three sections of the Reform Act have been analyzed for their impact on
in the statute may be interpreted in the manner used in other jurisdictions to extend
limitation periods by tying accrual to the incidents involved in a continuing physicianpatient relationship or even to its point of termination. LouIsELL, supra note 15, §§13.07-.09.
82. See Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660 (5th Cir. 1975), certifying to the Supreme
Court of Florida the question whether discoverability of "injury" under the 1973 statute
FLA. STAT. §95.11(4)(1973), means of the "cause of action" and also whether a judicial finding of a fraud exception to that statute requires an affirmative act of concealment.
Constitutional questions might be raised claiming the seven year cap on the fraud exception is unreasonable. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949). Alternately, the cap
can be attacked as defeating a right by foreclosing a remedy. FLA. CONST. art. I, §21.
83. For general discussion, see Maltempo v. Cuthbert, 288 So. 2d 517 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1974) stating: "There is no controlling precedent in Florida." McCloskey & Co. v. Eckart,
164 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1947); Dyke v. Richard, 390 Mich. 739, 213 N.W.2d 185 (1973).
84. Such as the clause provided in FLA. STAT. §95.022 (1974 Supp.): "Effective date;
saving clause. - This act shall become effective January 1, 1975, but any action that will
be barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have been barred under prior
law may be commenced before January 1, 1976, and if it is not commenced by that date, the
action shall be barred."
85. Sect. 9, Reform Act, provides that the limitation on the ad damnum clause "shall
not apply to any complaint filed prior to the effective date of this act." Fla. Laws 1975,
ch. 75-9, §9.
86. Maltempo v. Cuthbert, 288 So. 2d 517 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1974). Indemnity Ins. Co.
v. Brooks-Fisher Insulating Co., 140 So. 2d 613 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
87. May 20, 1975. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §17.
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the medical malpractice litigational system. They amount to little more
than nibbles. The medical profession may have wished for a larger bite, but
the legislative reaction reflects a continuing, if weakening, concern for patients'
interests.
The informed consent section supports a patient's right to know what
risks are entailed in proposed medical treatment.88 Complete deference to
medical attitudes would have brought an abandonment of the discovery approach in the medical malpractice statute of limitations. As it is, probably
only a comparatively few unsuspecting patients will be barred from remedy
as a result of the legislative compromise.8 9 Still, there was an apparent political
sacrifice of one group of patients' rights in the amendment to the statute
of frauds that bars suit on oral guarantees. This amendment ought to be
repudiated by either legislative or judicial action. 90
There is no apparent reason why any effort should be made to discriminate
against patients who are injured either through medical negligence or incident to misleading medical practices or assurances. No case has been made
that the malpractice insurance problem should be solved by creating (or
preserving) a privileged class of practitioners. Fortunately, the Florida Legislature has so far largely resisted pressure to implement that sort of policy,
but indications are that such pressure will increase.
In point are two of the recommendations of the Florida Medical Liability
Insurance Commission: 91 (1) The "development of a statutory definition of
medical negligence"; (2) A "complete review of the torts reparation system
with a view toward substantial changes in the entire system as it applies to
medical malpractice only.' 92 The recommendation, on its very face, is potentially harmful not only because it encourages a discriminatory solution
but also insofar as it misconceives the general legislative capacity to overpower

88.

As supported in tile
finding that there is such a right, HEW, REPORT OF SECRE74 (1973).
89. The Secretary's Commission, supra note 88, made no specific recommendation for
abandonment or change of medical malpractice statutes of limitation, except that they not
be interpreted discriminatorily against health professional defendant. Id. at 34.
90. The Secretary's Commission, supra note 88 did not recommend such a drastic approach to the problem of oral guarantees, only that contract doctrine not be used to
provide patient claimants with a longer period to initiate action than they had under
tort theory. Id. at 33.
91. Created by section 2, Reform Act. Fla. Laws 1975, ch. 75-9, §2 to be codified as
FLA.STAT. §627.352.
92. Report of the Florida Medical Liability Insurance Commission to the Governor and
the Florida Legislature, available from Office of the State Treasurer, Tallahassee Florida
10-11 (1975-1976) (emphasis added). Other recommendations are to: (1) Extend the life of
the Commission to January 1, 1977; (2) broaden the requirement for internal risk management programs to apply to all hospitals and certain other in-house patient care areas; (3)
modify the patients' Compensation Fund to provide for a limited no-fault compensation
system for hospital-based medical "incidents," funded by patient fees, and covering expenses for two years for corrective and rehabilitative services; (4) change from lump sum
settlements and judgments to periodic payments approaches; and (5) provide a variety of
recommendations in connection with the Joint Underwriting Association established by
the Reform Act. Id.
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judicial approaches by taking small bites. As the previous analysis of informed
consent shows, drafting such a check on the judiciary is virtually impossible.
Similarly, it is difficult to imagine what statutory definition of medical
negligence could-at once be an improvement on the judicial approach - truly
controlling and yet not flagrantly discriminatory. In the same order is a
legislative effort to control, from case to case, the judicial allocation of the
burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proof.93 In
such matters draftsmen, lobbyists, and commissions tend to show their
naivet6 both of the law they would change and of the interplay of legal
institutions. 94
On the other hand, a study of the torts reparation system is certainly
in order to determine if it should be replaced or complemented by some
form of "no-fault" insurance reparation approach or by arbitration methods. 95
Then too, if it can be shown that a specific legal doctrine is unfair and discriminatory against physicians as a general class, that ought to be known,
just as myths of such discrimination should be dispelled.
Most important of all, if such a study is to be conducted, it ought to be
in the spirit set forth in the Report of the Commission on Medical Malpractice established by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare. This report recommended "that legal doctrines relating to the
liability of health professionals should be applied in the same manner as
they are applied to all classes of defendants, whether they be favorable or
unfavorable to health professional defendants."99
93. Exhibit B of the Medical Liability Insurance Commission Report indicates items
that should be included in a review of the tort reparations system. One item would be
"elimination of the 'Res Ipsa Loquitur' situation. That is, the burden of proof of malpractice would be placed on the plaintiff." Among other items are: shortening of the
statute of limitations and the discovery period of malpractice cases; re-establishment of
the locality rule, at least for small town doctors; and the elimination of punitive damages.
This list is probably not meant to be exhaustive.
94. The suggestion that punitive damages be eliminated in malpractice cases may be
a pejorative way of describing damages for pain and suffering, supra, note 93. See also
reference to placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff. Id. Still, to those knowledgeable
in the area it seems unfortunate misinformation, deserving no citation to remind that
punitive damages are not allowed in negligence cases and that the burden of proof is
on the plaintiff even in res ipsa loquitur cases. Id.
95. Exhibit B, see note 93 supra, includes no-fault and arbitration consideration among
its items. See also item no. 3, supra note 92.
96. HEW, REPORT OF SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 31 (1973).
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